Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

Message Text

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 10476 01 OF 05 031655Z

45
ACTION PRS-01

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 A-01

OPR-02 SAM-01 IO-14 ACDA-19 AEC-11 AECE-00 NASA-04

SAJ-01 SCI-06 DRC-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03

INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 SP-03 SS-20

SSO-00 /145 W
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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 555

UNCLAS SECTION 1 OF 5 MOSCOW 10476

E.O. 11652: NA
TAGS: PFOR, UR, US
SUBJECT: KISSINGER PRESS CONFERENCE JULY 3

1. THERE FOLLOWS TEXT OF SECRETARY'S JULY 3 PRESS CONFERENCE FROM INTOURIST HOTEL, MOSCOW (10:10 A.M. - 11:15 A.M., MOSCOW TIME).

2. BEGIN QUOTE

MR. ZIEGLER: SECRETARY KISSINGER HAS APPEARED HERE BEFORE, SO I DON'T THINK HE NEEDS ANY INTRODUCTION.

YOU HAVE ALL OF THE MATERIAL THAT WILL BE SIGNED TODAY, AND THE COMMUNIQUE.I GUESS JERRY HAS EXPLAINED TO YOU THE FACT THAT THERE WAS A SECTION INADVERTNELTY LEFT OUT OF THE COMMUNIQUE YOU HAVE, AND APPARENTLY HE IS RUNNING OFF THAT INSERT NOW. I BELIEVE HE HAS DESCRIBED THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES, SO I WON'T DWELL ON IT.

THE SECRETARY, FIRST OF ALL, WILL MAKE AN OPENING STATEMENT AND THEN TAKE YOUR QUESTIONS.
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PAGE 02 MOSCOW 10476 01 OF 05 031655Z

MR. SECRETARY

Q. COULD WE HAVE THE SECTION READ TO US SO WE KNOW WHAT IT SAYS?

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

MR. ZIEGLER: SECRETARY KISSINGER HAS THAT SECTION.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: BUT THEN THEY WILL BE ABLE
TO ASK QUESTIONS ON IT. (LAUGHTER)

1. WE DON'T HAVE ONE PROTOCOL MENTIONED IN THE
COMMUNIQUE.

MR. ZIEGLER: THE SECRETARY WILL COVER THAT WITH
YOU AND THE REASON FOR IT.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: MR ZIEGLER SAID I SHOULD
ENTITLE THIS BRIEFING, "THE VIEW FROM TEN FEET BEHIND."
LAUGHTER) THEY DON'T READ THE POOL REPORTS.

I THOUGHT I WOULD GIVE YOU A BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE
SUMMIT AS WE SEE IT, AND I THINK THE BEST WAY TO START IS
TO LOOK AT IT IN TERMS OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE IN WHICH I TRIED
TO EXPLAIN THE PURPOSES OF THE MEETING.

I POINTED OUT THAT THERE ARE THREE FUNDAMENTAL
PURPOSES IN THESE SUMMIT MEETINGS; ONE, FOR THE LEADERS
OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES TO EXCHANGE
IDEAS AND TO CHECK ASSESSMENTS ABOUT INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
IN GENERAL.

THE NECESSITY FOR THIS ARISES BECAUSE AS THE
TWO NATIONS CAPABLE OF DESTROYING HUMANITY, THE HAVE A SPECIAL
OBLIGATION TO PREVENT CONFLICTS CAUSED BY INADVERTENCE, BY
MISCALCULATION, BY MISASSESSMENT OF EACH OTHER'S MOTIVES,
EXAMPLES OF WHICH HISTORY IS REPLETE.

THE SECOND IS TO SEE WHETHER THEY CAN, BY MEETING
THE NEEDS OF THEIR PEOPLES AND OF MANKING, CONSTRUCT A NETWORK
OF POSITIVE RELATIONSHIPS, THAT WILL PROVIDE AN INCENTIVE
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PAGE 03 MOSCOW 10476 01 OF 05 031655Z

FOR MODERATION AND FOR A BENEFICIAL AND HUMANE CONDUCT OF
FOREIGN POLICY.

THE SECOND LARGE OBJECTIVE IS TO PREVENT THE
NUCLEAR ARMS RACE AND THE ARMS RACE IN GENERAL FROM DOMIN-
ATING INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, AND I WANT TO STRESS AGAIN
THAT THIS OBJECTIVE IS NO MEAN GOAL AND ONE THAT WILL
OCCUPY AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIONS IN THE ABSENCE OF COMPRE-
HENSIVE AGREEMENTS FOR AS NEARINTO THE FUTURE AS WE CAN SEE.

IT IS NOT ONLY THE COMPLEXITY OF THE WEAPONS AND
THEIR DESTRUCTIVENESS, IT IS ALSO THE JUSTIFICATIONS THAT
WILL HAVE TO BE USED IN EACH COUNTRY TO SUSTAIN LARGE
ARMAMENT PROGRAMS THAT WILL, OVER A PERIOD OF TIME, PRESENT

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

A MAJOR OBSTACLE TO THE HUMANE OR EVEN SAFE CONDUCT OF
FOREIGN POLICY.

AND THE THIRD GENERAL GOAL IS TO IDENTIFY THOSE
AREAS OF COMMON INTERESTS, EITHER PRODUCED BY THE NONMILITARY
ASPECTS OF TECHNOLOGY OR BY OTHERS OR BY THE NATURE OF MODERN
LIFE IN WHICH THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES CAN
COOPERATE AND THEREBY CREATE A PERSPECTIVE ON WORLD AFFAIRS
THAT RECONGNIZES THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF EVENTS AND THE FACT
THAT ISOLATION AND CONFRONTATION AREA, OVER A PERIOD OF TIME,
INIMICAL TO PROGRESS AND INCONSISTENT WITH HUMAN ASPIRATIONS.

NOW, IN TERMS OF THESE THREE OBJECTIVES, A GREAT
DEAL OF TIME WAS SPENT BY THE TWO LEADERS IN REVIEWING
THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION, AND I WILL GET INTO DETAILS WHEN
I GO THROUGH THE VARIOUS DOCUMENTS.

THERE WERE THE MOST EXTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS AT THAT
LEVEL OF THE ARMS RACE THAT HAVE EVER TAKEN PLACE, AND WITH
A FRANKNESS THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED INCONCEIVABLE
TWO YEARS AGO, INDEED WITH AN AMOUNT OF DETAIL THAT WOULD
HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED VIOLATING INTELLIGENCE CODES IN PREVIOUS
PERIODS.

SO, ON THE ISSUE OF SALT, FOR EXAMPLE, ON WHICH
I WILL HAVE MORE TO SAY IN A FEW MINUTES, THE WORDS OF
THE COMMUNIQUE THAT FAR REACHING AND DEEP CONVERSATIONS
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PAGE 04 MOSCOW 10476 01 OF 05 031655Z

TOOK PLACE, ARE OF VERY PROFOUND SIGNIFICANCE, AND IN THE
NEXT PHASE OF THE DISUCSSIONS, DIFFICULTIES CANNOT BE
CAUSED BY MISAPPREHENSIONS ABOUT EACH OTHER'S GENERAL
INTENTIONS AND GENERALPERCEPTIONS OF THE NATURE OF THE
STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT.

AND THIRDLY, THERE WERE A SERIES OF AGREEMENTS,
ABOUT MOST OF WHICH YOU HAVE ALREADY BEEN BRIEFED, IN THE
FIELD OF COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIPS.

NOW, LET ME SPEAK FOR MYSELF ABOUT THE TWO AREAS
OF ARMS CONTROL AND THE GENERALREVIEW OF THE INTER-
NATIONAL SITUATION.

WITH RESPECT TO ARMS CONTROL, LET ME COVER FIRST
THE AGREEMENTS THAT HAVE BEEN MADE AND THEN LET ME TALK
ABOUT THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATIONS TALKS.

WITH RESPECT TO THE AGREEMENTS THAT HAVE BEEN
MADE, THERE ARE THREE, THE AGREEMENT THAT NEITHER SIDE WILL
BUILD THE SECOND ABM SITE, THE AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITED
THRESHOLD TEST BAN AND THIRDLY, THE AGREEMENT TO BEGIN
NEGOTIATIONS ON ENVIRONMENTAL WARFARE.

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

WITH RESPECT TO THE FIRST AGREEMENT IN WHICH BOTH
SIDES FOREGO THE SECOND ABM SITE, YOU REMEMBER THAT THE
PERMANENT AGREEMENT ON DEFENSIVE WEAPONS SIGNED IN MOSCOW
IN 1972, PERMITTED EACH OF THE TWO COUNTRIES TO MAINTAIN
TWO ABM SITES, ONE TO DEFEND ITS CAPITAL, THE SECOND TO
DEFEND AN ICBM FIELD PROVIDED THAT FIELD WAS NO CLOSER
THAN 1,300 KILOMETERS TO THE CAPITAL.

THE UNITED STATES AT THAT TIME OPTED FOR A
DEFENSE OF AN ICBM FIELD, THE SOVIET UNION OPTED FOR
A DEFENSE OF ITS CAPITAL. THERE WERE PROVISIONS OF THE
NUMBER OF INTERCEPTORS AND RADARS THAT COULD BE MAINTAINED AT
EACH SITE, BUT THERE IS NO POINT IN GOING THROUGH THESE.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION HAVE
NOW DECIDED TO FOREGO THAT SECOND ABM SITE AND TO MAINTAIN
ONLY THE ONE ABM SITE THAT EACH CURRENTLY HAS WHICH IS
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PAGE 05 MOSCOW 10476 01 OF 05 031655Z

MOSCOW FOR THE SOVIET UNION, AND ICBM FIELD FOR THE
UNITED STATES. HOWEVER, BECAUSE IT WAS THOUGHT DESIRABLE
TO KEEP SOME FLEXIBILITY WITH RESPECT TO WHICH AREA COULD
BE DEFENDED, EACH SIDE IS PERMITTED AT ONE TIME DURING THE
COURSE OF THE AGREEMENT AND ONCE IN A FIVE-YEAR PERIOD,
TO ALTER ITS ORIGINAL DECISION.

IN OTHER WORDS, IF THE UNITED STATES SHOULD
DECIDE THAT IT WOULD PREFER TO DEFEND WASHINGTON
THAN THE ICBM SITE, WE HAVE THE OPTION ONCE IN A FIVE-YEAR
PERIOD TO MOVE FROM THE ICBM SITE TO WASHINGTON AND
EQUALLY THE SOVIET UNION HAS THE OPTION OF MOVING ONCE
IN THAT FIVE-YEAR PERIOD FROM MOSCOW TO AN ICBM SITE.

THAT OPTION, HAVING ONCE BEEN EXERCISED, CANNOT
BE EXERCISED THE SECOND TIME. IN OTHER WORDS, COUNTRIES
CANNOT SHUTTLE THEIR ABM SITES BACK AND FORTH BETWEEN THE
CAPITAL AND AN ICBM FIELD. EACH SIDE, IN SHORT, HAS THE
OPTION ONCE TO REVERSE ITS ORIGINAL DECISION AND IT MAY
DO SO ONCE IN ANY FIVE-YEAR PERIOD WHEN THE TREATY COMES
UP FOR AUTOMATIC REVIEW.

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PAGE 01 MOSCOW 10476 02 OF 05 031852Z

42
ACTION PRS-01

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 A-01

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

OPR-02 SAM-01 IO-14 ACDA-19 AEC-11 AECE-00 NASA-04

SAJ-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 556

UNCLAS SECTION 2 OF 5 MOSCOW 10476

THE SIGNIFICANCE
OF THIS AGREEMENT IS THAT IT
REENFORCES THE ORIGINAL DECISION IMPLICIT IN 1972, IN
FACT, EXPLICIT IN 1972, THAT NEITHER SIDE WOULD MAINTAIN
ABM DEFENSES. IT MAKES IT EVEN MORE DIFFICULT, IF NOT
IMPOSSIBLE, TO BREAK OUT OF THE AGREEMENT RAPIDLY, AND
IN TURN, THE DECISION TO FOREGO ABM DEFENSES THAS PROFOUND

STRATIGIC
CONSEQUENCES WHICH ARE SOMETIMES LOST SIGHT OF

YOU MUST REMEMBER THAT THE ORIGINAL IMPETUS FOR
THE MULTIPLE WARHEADS DERIVED FROM THE DESIRE OR THE
NECESSITY TO OVERCOME ABM DEFENSES AND TO MAKE SURE THAT
THE REQUIRED NUMBER OF MISSILES WOULD GET THROUGH.

IN THE ABSENCE OF ABM DEFENSES, THE EXTRAORDINARY
NUMBER OF FORESEEABLE MULTIPLE WARHEADS WILL CREATE A
SITUATION IN WHICH SUCH TERMS AS SUPERIORITY SHOULD NOT
BE LIGHTLY THROWN AROUND BECAUSE THEY MAY BE DEVOID OF
ANY OPERATIONAL MEANING.
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 10476 02 OF 05 031852Z

THE NOTION OF NUCLEAR SUFFICIENCY OF WHAT IS
NECESSARY UNDER CONDITIONS OF NO ABM DEFENSES REQUIRES
CAREFUL CORRELATION WITH THE NUMBER OF AVAILABLE WARHEADS.
FOR PRESENT PRUPOSES, I WANT TO SAY THAT ANY IEAD THAT
ANY COUNTRY CAN EASILY ACHIEVE STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY IS
ALMOST DEVOID, UNDER THESE CONDITIONS, OF ANY OPERATIONAL
SIGNIFICANCE AND CAN ONLY HAVE A NUMERICAL SIGNIFICANCE.

THE ABM AGREEMENT REENFORCES THE ELEMENT OF
STRATEGIC STABILITY THAT WAS INHERENT IN THE ORIGINAL
ABM AGREEMENT MADE IN 1972. THE SECOND AGREEMENT ON
THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN PROHIBITS UNDEFGROUND NUCLEAR
EXPLOSIONS ABOVE 150 KILOTONS AND WILL THEREFORE HAVE THE
TENDENCY TO CONCENTRATE THAT COMPETITION IN THE RANGES OF
THE LOWER YIELD WEAPONS. THE DATE FOR ITS GOING INTO

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

EFFECT HAS BEEN PUT INTO THE FUTURE BECAUSE A NUMBER OF
ADDITIONAL AGREEMENTS REMAIN TO BE WORKED OUT.

THERE REMAINS TO HAVE AN AGREEMENT ON THE
PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS IN WHICH ADEQUATE
ASSURANCE WILL BE GIVEN THAT THEY WILL NOT BE USED TO
CIRCUMVENT THE INTENTION OF THE AGREEMENT AND THERE
IS AN AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE THAT THE INSPECTION OF
PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSION, AMONG OTHER THINGS, WILL INVOLVE
PRIOR NOTIFICATION, PRECISE DEFINITION OF THE TIME AND
PLACE, AND THE PRESENCE OF OBSERVERS WHICH IS A MAJOR
STEP FORWARD IN OUR DISCUSSIONS.

THE SECOND SUBJECT THAT WILL REQUIRE FURTHER
DISCUSSION IS THE EXCHANGE OR GEOLOGICAL INFORMATION WHICH
IS NEEDED FOR THE ADEQUATE VERIFICATION OF THIS THRESHOLD
TEST BAN.

THE THIRD AREA IN WHICH AN AGREEMENT WAS REACHED
WAS TO BEGIN DISCUSSIONS ON THE DANGERS OF ENVIRONMENTAL
WARFARE FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF OVERCOMING THESE DANGERS.
THIS IS A FORM OF WARFARE THAT IS IN ITS INFANCY, THE NATURE
OF WHICH IS NOT PROPERLY UNDERSTOOD AND WHICH OBVIOUSLY,
BY DEFICITION, CAN HAVE PROFOUND CONSEQUENCES FOR THE
FUTURE OF MANKIND.
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 MOSCOW 10476 02 OF 05 031852Z

THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION, IN THE
NEAR FUTURE, WILL OPEN DISCUSSIONS ON THIS PROBLEM OF
ENVIRONMENTAL WARFARE.

IN ADDITION TO THESE THREE AGREEMENTS, TWO
PROTOCOLS WILL BE SIGNED ON THE STANDING CONSULTATIVE
COMMISSION AND WE WILL CERTAINLY MAKE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY
BECAUSE IT WILL BE THE FIRST TIME THAT SECRET AGREEMENTS
ARE PUBLICLY SIGNED. THE AGREEMENTS ARE BEING KEPT SECRET
AT THE REQUEST OF THE SOVIET UNION BECAUSE THEY INVOLVE
DISMANTLING PROCEDURES FOR REPLACEMENT MISSILES UNDER
THE INTERIM AGREEMENT AND THE ABM AGREEMENT. HOWEVER,
THEY WILL BE SUBMITTED TO THE APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL
COMMITTEES UPON OUR RETURN TO THE UNITED STATES.

LET ME SAY A WORD ABOUT THE STANDING CONSULTATIVE
COMMISSION. THE STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION WAS CREATED
IN THE 1972 AGREEMENT, IN ORDER TO IMPLEMENT THE PROVISIONS
FOR REPLACEMENT OR DESTRUCTION OF WEAPONS UNDER THE TWO
AGREEMENTS ON DEFENSIVE AND OFFENSIVE WEAPONS.

THERE IS A PROTOCOL FOR DEFENSIVE WEAPONS, BECAUSE
THE UNITED STATES WILL HAVE TO DISMANTLE SOME DEPLOYMENTS
THAT HAVE TAKEN PLACE AT A SITE WHICH UNDER THE AGREEMENT
WE CAN NO LONGER

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

MAINTAIN AND THE SOVIET
UNION WILL HAVE

TO DISMANTLE 15 ABM LAUNCHERS AND ASSOCIATED RADARS ON
THEIR TEST RANGERS.

SECONDLY, THERE IS A PROTOCOL FOR OFFENSIVE
WEAPONS WHICH DISCUSSES DISMANTLING AND REPLACEMENT
PROCEDURE UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT
WHERE ALL LAND BASED MISSILES CAN BE TRADED IN FOR
MODERN SEA BASED MISSILES AND WHERE ODLER SUBMARINE LAUNCHED
NUCLEAR MISSILES CAN BE TRADED IN FOR NEWER SUBMARINE
LAUNCHED SEA BASED MISSILES.

THESE ARE THE TWO PROTOCOLS THAT HAVE BEEN THE
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PAGE 04 MOSCOW 10476 02 OF 05 031852Z

SUBJECT OF ILLUMINATING EXCHANGE THAT TOOK PLACE JUST
BEFORE I LEFT THE UNITED STATES.

IT MUST BE UNDERSTOOD THAT IT WAS THE ASSIGNMENT
FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION
TO WORK OUT PRECISE PROVISIONS FOR REPLACEMENT AND
DISMANTLING, THAT FOR THAT PURPOSE THEY HAD TO GO INTO
GREATER TEACHNICAL DETAIL THAN WAS THE CASE IN THE AGREEMENT
AND THAT WO PROTOCOLS WILL BE SIGNED, ONE TO IMPLEMENT
THE DEFENSIVE PROVISIONS, THE OTHER TO IMPLEMENT THE
OFFENSIVE PROVISIONS.

THEY BREAK NO NEW GROUND, THEY CHANGE NO
PROVISIONS. IF I MAY SAY SO, THEY CLOSE NO LOOPHOLES,
THEY DEAL ONLY WITH THE TECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF AGREE-
MENTS PREVIOUSLY REACHED. THEY WILL BE SUBMITTED TO
CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES. THEY ARE NOT POLICY DOCUMENTS.
THEY ARE TECHNICAL DOCUMENTS, IN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
1972 AGREEMENT, AND THEY ARE BEING SIGNED NOW AS A RESULT
OF WORK EXTENDING OVER A PERIOD FO 18 MONTHS BECAUSE IT
IS ONLY NOW THAT THE REPALCEMENT PROVISIONS ARE BECOMING
EFFECTIVE DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE MISSILES,
THE ICMB'S, DID NOT HAVE TO BE DISMANTLED
UNTIL THE SUBMARIYJS CONTAINING THE 741ST MISSILE ON THE
SOVIET SIDE UNDERWENT SEA TRIAL.

NOW THESE ARE THE AGREEMENTS THAT HAVE BEEN
REACHED.

NOW LET ME SAY A WORD ABOUT STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITA-
TION TALKS. AS I POINTED OUT, PRIOR TO OUR COMING HERE,
THE ADMINISTRATION CONSIDERS THE PROBLEM OF STRATEGIC
ARMS LIMITATION ONE OF THE CENTRAL ISSUES OF OUR TIME.
IT IS ONE OF THE CENTRAL ISSUES BECAUSE IF IT RUNS UNCHECKED
THE NUMBER OF WARHEAD WILL

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

REACH PROPORTIONS ASTRONOMICAL
COMPARED TO THE TIME WHEN ARMAGEDDON SEEMED NEAR, WHEN
THERE WERE SOMETHING LESS THAN 1,000 WARHEADS ON BOTH SIDES.

IT IS IMPORTANT BECAUSE A PERCEPTION MAY GROW
THAT THESE WARHEADS WILL PROVIDE A CAPABILITY WHICH WILL
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NOT BE SUSTAINED BY ANY SYSTEMATIC ANALYSIS, BUT BECAUSE
IN ANY EVENT THEY BRING ABOUT A GAP BETWEEN THE PERCEIVED
FIRST AND SECOND STRIKE CAPABILITIES WHICH IN ITSELF WILL
FUEL A CONSTATNLY ACCELERATING ARMS RACE.

NOW THE PROBLEM WE FACE IN THESE DISCUSSIONS IS
THAT UNDER THE INTERIM AGREEMENT THE SOVIET UNION POSSESSES
MORE MISSILES, THOUGH IF YOU ADD TOGETHER THE TOTAL NUMBER
OF LAUNCHERS THAT IS TO SAY, STRATEGIC BOMBERS, THERE IS
NO SIGNIFICANT GAP, AND AFTER ALL, IT WAS NOT THE SOVIET
UNION THAT MADE US BUILD BOMBERS, THAT WAS OUR OWN DECISION
AND THEREFORE, AN ATTEMPT HAS BEEN MADE TO ESTABLISH
A CORRELATION BETWEEN THE NUMBER OF MIRV MISSILES AND THE
NUMBER OF LAUNCHERS IN WHICH PERHAPS TO SOME EXTENT THE LARGER
NUMBERS OF MISSILES ON ONE SIDE CAN BE OFFSET BY A
LARGER NUMBER OF MIRV'S ON THE OTHER.

THE DIFFICULTY WITH THIS APPROACH HAS BEEN THE
LIMITED TIME FRAME WITHIN WHICH IT WAS ATTEMPTED TO BE
IMPLEMENTED SO THAT DURING THE MAXIMUM DEPLOYMENT PERIOD
IT WOULD NOT BE CLEAR WHETHER ANY OF THESE LIMITATIONS
WOULD NOT SIMPLY BE TO PROVIDE A BASE FOR A BREAKOUT WHEN
THE AGREEMENT LAPSED.

THERE FORE, THE TWO LEADERS AHVE DECIDED THAT
THE PRINCIPAL FOCUS OF THE DISCUSSIONS WOULD NOT BE
ON A BRIEF EXTENSION OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT TIED TO
AN EQUALLY BRIEF MIRV AGREEMENT, BUT TO SEE WHETHER THE
THREE FACTORS, TIME, QUNATITY OF LAUNCHERS AND QUANTITY
OF WARHEADS CANNOT BE RELATED IN A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE
AND STABLIZIING FASHION OVER A LONGER PERIOD OF TIME,
THAT IS TO SAY, BY 1985.

AND IN THAT CONTEXT, SOME OF THE DIFFICULTY
OF RELATING THE VARIOUS ASYMMETRIES IN NUMBER CAN BE
TAKEN CARE OF AND A STABILITY CAN BE PERHAPS ACHIEVED
IN DEPLOYMENT RATES THAT WOULD REMOVE, TO A CONSIDERABLE
EXTENT, THE INSECURITIES INHERENT IN AN UNCHECKED
ARMS RACE.

AS THE COMMUNIQUE SAYS, THE TWO SIDES WILL
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Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

RECONVENE THEIR DELEGATIONSIN GENEVA ON THE BASIS OF
THIS APPROACH AND ON THE BASIS OF INSTRUCTIONS GROWING
OUT OF THE SUMMIT MEETING.

WITH RESPECT TO THE REVIEW OF THE INTERNATIONAL
SITUATION IMPLICIT IN THE COMMUNIQUE, I THINK I WILL
CONFINE MYSELF TO A FEW OBSERVATIONS AND PRIMARILY ANSWER
YOUR QUESTIONS.

THE BASIC PRUPOSE OF THIS REVIEW WAS, AS I HAVE
POINTED OUT, TO ATTEMPT TO AVOID MISCALCULATION AND WHERE
POSSIBLE, BRING ABOUT COOPERATIVE ACTION.

IN EUROPE, THE PRINCIPAL FOCUS WERE TWO SUBJECTS:
THE EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE AND THE MUTUAL BALANCED
FORCE REDUCTIONS.

WITH RESPECT TO THE EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE,
THE UNITED STATES REPEATED IT S POSITION, WHICH IS THAT WE
ARE PREPARED TO HAVE THAT SECURITY CONFERENCE END AT THE
SUMMIT LEVEL IF THE RESULTS OF THE CONFERENCE WARRANT IT,
AND THAT WE WOULD BELIEVE THAT SUCH A CONFERENCE, WITH
ADEQUATE RESULTS, COULD MAKE A CONTRIBUTION TO EUROPEAN
SECURITY.

THAT PHRASE HAS BEEN USED BY WESTERN STATESMEN
NOW FOR TWO YEARS, AND IT WILL NOT IN ITSELF ADVANCE
MATTERS UNTIL WE CAN DEFINE FOR OURSELVES WHAT RESULTS WE
CONSTITUTE JUSTIFYING A SUMMIT CONFERENCE. WE HAVE PUT
THAT QUESTION TO OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES AT OTTAWA, DISCUSSIONS
OF IT HAVE BEGUN IN BRUSSELS, AND WE HOPE TO BE ABLE TO HAVE
AT LEAST A WESTERN ANSWER TO THIS IN THE RELATIVELY
NEAR FUTURE.

WITH RESPECT TO THE MIDDLE EAST, I WILL READ
THE PART YOU DON'T HAVE.

"BOTH SIDES BELIEVE THAT THE REMOVAL OF THE DANGER
OF WAR AND TENSION IN THE MIDDLE EAST IS A TASK OF PARAMOUNT
IMPORTANCE AND URGENCY, AND THEREFORE, THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE
IS THE ACHIEVEMENT ON THE BASIS OF U.S. SECURITY COUNCIL
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PAGE 07 MOSCOW 10476 02 OF 05 031852Z

RESOLUTION 338, OF A JUST AND LASTING PEACE SETTLEMENT IN
WHICH SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT THE LEGITIMATE
INTERESTS OF ALL PEOPLES IN THE MIDDLE EAST, INCLUDING THE
PALESTINIAN PEOPLE, AND THE RIGHT TO EXISTENCE OF ALL
STATES IN THE AREA.

"AS CO-CHAIRMEN OF THE GENEVA PEACE CONFERENCE
ON THE MIDDLE EAST, THE USA AND THE USSR CONSDIER IT

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

IMPORTANT THAT THE CONFERENCE RESUME ITS WORK AS SOON AS
POSSIBLE, WITH THE QUESTION OF OTHER PARTICIPATNS FROM THE
MIDDLE EAST AREA TO BE DISCUSSED AT THE CONFERENCE. BOTH
SIDES SEE THE MAIN PURPOSE OF THE GENEVA PEACE CONFERENCE,
THE ACHIEVEMENT OF WHICH THEY WILL PROMOTE IN EVERY WAY, AS
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF JUST AND STABLE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

"THEY AGREED THAT THE USA AND THE USSR WILL
CONTINUE TO REMAIN IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH A VIEW TOWARD
COORDINATING THE EFFORTS OF BOTH COUNTRIES TOWARD A PEACEFUL
SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST."

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 10476 03 OF 05 031831Z

42
ACTION PRS-01

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 A-01

OPR-02 SAM-01 IO-14 ACDA-19 AEC-11 AECE-00 NASA-04

SAJ-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00

NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 SP-03 SS-20 DRC-01 SCI-06 SSO-00

/145 W
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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHXC IMMEDIATE 557

UNCLAS SECTION 3 OF 5 MOSCOW 10476

THIS IS THE EXTENT OF THE MIDDLE EAST SECTION,
WHICH WILL BE DISTRIBUTED TO YOU AS SOON AS THIS BRIEFING
IS OVER.

FINALLY, THE COMMUNIQUE LISTS THE AREA OF BILATERAL
RELATIONS THAT HAVE ALREADY BEEN COVERED IN PREVIOUS BRIEFINGS
ON WHICH SEPARATE AGREEMNTS WERE SIGNED. IN ADDITION TO THE
ONES THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNED, THERE WILL BE ADDITIONAL
COOPERATION IN SPACE AND TECHNOLGY OF HIGH SPEED TRANS-
PORTATION AND IN THE AREA OF ENVIORNMENTAL PROTECTION WHERE
BOTH SIDES WILL CREATE BIOSPHERE AREAS; THAT IS, AREAS WHICH
ARE KEPT FREE OF THE ENCROACHMENT OF MODERN TECHNOLOGY
TO USE FOR PURPOSES OF COMPARISON WITH AREAS IN WHICH MAJOR
ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS ARE POSED.

NOW, THESE ARE THE MAIN OUTLINES OF THE CONFERENCE,
AND OF THE AGREEMENTS THAT HAVE BEEN SIGNED. THEY SHOULD
BE SEEN IN THE CONTEXT OF WHAT IS NOW AND WHAT WILL REMAIN

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

FOR THE DECADES AHEAD, THE PROBLEM OF PRESERVING THE PEACE:
NAMELY, THAT THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION
MAKE EVERY HONORABLE EFFORT TO AVOID THE CATASTROPHE OF
WAR, AND EVERY ENDEAVOR TO IMPROVE THE LOT OF HUMANITY, AND
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 10476 03 OF 05 031831Z

THAT FOR THIS PURPOSE THE REGULAR MEETING OF THEIR LEADERS --
WHICH THE COMMUNIQUE POINTS OUT CAN BE SUPPLEMENTED FOR
SPECIAL OCCASIONS BETWEEN THE YEARLY INTERVALS THAT HAVE BEEN
SET -- PERFORMS AN ESSENTIAL ROLE.

I WOULD BE GLAD TO ANSWER QUESTIONS NOW.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, DOESN'T YOUR MIDDLE EAST
SECTION SUGGEST A CHANGE IN U.S. POLICY, AND DOESN'T IT
NOW ADVOCATE THE SEATING OF THE PALESTINIANS AT THE GENEVA
PEACE CONFERENCE AS THE SOVIETS WANTED?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: ABSOLUTELY NOT.

Q. WHAT DOES IT MEAN THEN?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: WHAT IT MEANS IS THAT
THIS SENTENCE ABOUT THE PROBLEM OF THE PARTICIPATION OF
OTHERS FROM THE MIDDLE EAST IS VERBATIM, DRAWN FROM THE
ORIGINAL LETTER OF INVITATION TO THE GENEVA CONFERENCE,
AND IT ADDS NOT ONE WORD TO THE ORIGINAL LETTER IN WHICH
THE INVITIATION WAS EXTENDED TO THE PARTIES THAT ARE NOW AT
THE GENEVA CONFERENCE.

INDEED, IT IS A SLIGHT REDUCTION FROM IT WHERE
IT WAS SAID THAT THIS PROBLEM WOULD BE DISUCSSED IN THE
FIRST STAGE, AND HERE IT SIMPLY SAYS IT WILL BE DISCUSSED
AT THE GENEVA PEACE CONFERENCE.

Q. DR. KISSINGER, TWO QUESTIONS. ONE, HOW DID
YOU ARRIVE AT THE DATE 1985 ON THE SLT BUSINESS AS A
CONCLUDING DATE OR TERMINATING DATE?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: BECAUSE WE COULDN'T PICK
1984. (LAUGHTER)

Q. THAT IS WHAT I THOUGHT, BUT I KNOW YOU
WILL GIVE A MORE SERIOUS ANSWER IN A MINUTE. AND SECONDLY,
WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE INSTRUCTION THAT WILL BE GOING OUT
TO THE DELEGATION THAT WILL RECONVENE IN GENEVA, AND
APPROXIMATELY WHEN WILL THEY START?
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 MOSCOW 10476 03 OF 05 031831Z

SECRETARY KISSIGNER: WE WOULD EXPECT THEM TO START

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

AROUND AUGUST 1, GIVE OR TAKE TWO WEEKS. THE DATE 1985 WAS PICKED FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS.

WE HAD BEEN THINKING IN TERMS OF EXTENDING THE INTERIM AGREEMENT BY PERHAPS TWO OR THREE YEARS AND AT THE SAME TIME COUPLING WITH IT SOME MIRV LIMITATIONS. THIS PRESENTED A NUMBER OF EXTRAORDINARILY DIFFICULT PROBLEMS, BECAUSE WE WOULD BE PRESSED IN TERMS OF QUANTITY, SINCE A NUMBER OF OUR NEW PROGRAMS SUCH AS TRIDENT ARE GOING TO BE DEPLOYED STARTING AROUND 1978, 1979, AND ON THE OTHER HAND, THE SOVIET UNION WULD BE PRESSED IN TERMS OF QUALITY BECAUSE THEIR DEPLOYMENT OF MIRVS IS ONLY NOW STARTING AND THE DIFFICULTY OF MAKING AN AGREEMENT WITH A CUTOFF DATE OF 1979 IS WHEN YOU HAVE GONE THROUGH ALL THE AGONY, YOU HAVE NOT PUT A CAP ON THE RATE OF DEPLOYMENT, MOST OF WHICH WILL BE OCCURRING AFTER 1978, 1979.

SO, IT SEEMED TO US THAT BY PICKING A PERIOD OF 1985, ONE COULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE PROJECTED PROGRAMS AND PUT ON LIMITATIONS THAT WOULD HAVE SOME OPEAATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE IN WHICH IN ANY EVENT WOULD INTRODUCE SOME STABILITY INTO DEPLOYMENT RATES IN SUCH A WAY THAT IT WAS NOT EACH SIDE'S PERCEPTION OF THE OTHER, THAT WOULD BE DRIVING IT INTO AN EVER ACCELERATING SPIRAL.

AS WE WERE DISCUSSING ON SUNDAY, THE VARIOUS WAYS OF TACKLING THE PROBLEM, IT BECAME APPARENT THAT ONE OF THE BIG OBSTACLES WAS THE SHORT TIME FRAME WHICH WE WERE CONSIDER-ING AND THAT FOR WHAT WE HAD IN MIND IT WAS REALLY NECESSARY TO LOOK AT IT IN A LONGER TIME FRAME.

ON THE OTHER HAND, WHEN YOU TALK OF A PERMANENT AGREEMENT, YOU GET YOURSELF FROZEN INTO SITUATIONS IN WHICH THE TECHNOLOGY IS SO UNPREDICTABLE THAT IT IS VERY DIFFICULT TO MAKE REASONABLE JUDGMENTS, AND THIS IS WHY THE PERIOD 1985 WAS CHOSEN.

IT WAS CHOSEN IN THE HOPE, NOT THE ASSURANCE, THAT IF SUCH AN AGREEMENT WERE REACHED NEXT YEAR, WE WOULD BE UNCLASSIFIED

TALKING OF A TEN-YEAR AGREEMENT. THIS IS ONE OF THE FACTORS.

Q. COULD I FOLLOW THAT, BECAUSE IT SEEMS IMPORTANT. YOU TALKED ABOUT THE TECHNOLOGICAL EXPLOSION IN BRUSSELS, I THINK. DOES THIS NOT SUGGEST THAT IN THE PERIOD BETWEEN NOW AND 1985 YOU WILL HAVE ONE HELL OF AN ARMS RACE GOING ON?

SECRETARY KISSIGNER: NO. IT DEPENDS WHEN THE AGREEMENT IS MADE. AS I SAID IN BRUSSELS, AND I MAINTAIN, THAT WE HAVE ABOUT 18 MONTHS TO GAIN CONTROL OF THE MULTIPLE WARHEADS, CONTROL NOT IN THE SENSE OF ELIMINATING

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

IT, BUT BY INTRODUCING SOME STABILITY INTO THE RATE AND
NATURE OF THEIR DEPLOYMENT.

IF AN AGREEMENT IS REACHED WITHIN THAT TIME
FRMAE, MORE OR LESS--THAT DOESN'T MEAN DOWN TO THE
LAST MONTH, THEN IT CAN MAKE A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO
TURNING DOWN THE ARMS RACE, TO INCLUDING THE PROBLEM OF
REDUCTION TO WHICH WE ATTACH IMPORTANCE AND TO BRING
STABILITY INTO THE STRATEGIC EQUATION.

WITH EVERY SIX-MONTH PERIOD THAT IT IS DELAYED,
THE PROBLEM BECOMES MORE COMPLICATED, BUT THE POINT IS
PRECISELY TO AVOID WHAT YOU CALLED THE HELL OF AN ARMS
RACE, AND THE DIFFICULTY, AS YOU ANALYZE THE PROBLEM WITH
CUTOFF DATES OF 1977, 1979, IS THAT BOTH SIDES WILL BE
PREPARING FOR THE BREAK OF THE AGREEMENT WHILE THEY
ARE NEGOTIATING THE AGREEMENT, AND IT BPCAME CLEAR THAT
ONF OF THE OBSTACLES WAS THAT BOTH SIDES, WHILE NEGOTIATING
LIMITATIONS, WERE ALSO PUTTING THEMSELVES INTO THE POSITION
OF THE AGREEMENT LAPSING AND, THEREFORE, HAVING TO DEVELOP
PROGRAMS THAT WOULD BE PRESSING AGAINST LIMITS OF THE
AGREEMENT AT THE EDGE OF ITS TIME PERIOD AND FOR THAT
VERY REASON HAVE ANOTHER VESTED INTEREST NOT TO HAVE
AN AGREEMENT.

Q. DR. KISSINGER, GENERAL SECRETARY BREZHNEV
SAID LAST NIGHT THAT THESE ACCORDS COULD HAVE BEEN STILL
BROADER THAN THEY WERE. FIRST, I WOULD LIKE YOUR COMMENTS
ON THAT AND ALSO WHETHER IT IS NOT CORRECT THEN FROM YOUR
INTERPRETATION THAT ONE COULD NOT SAY THERE ARE AGREED
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 05 MOSCOW 10476 03 OF 05 031831Z

GUIDELINES ON THE MIRV WARHEAD NEGOTIATIONS.

SECONDLY, ON THE QUESTION OF THE UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR
TEST BAN, COULD YOU CLARIFY WITH SOME FIGURES WHAT I BELIEVE
IS A FACT THAT THE LIMIT OF 150 KILOTONS WOULD PERMIT
ALL CONTINUING UNDERGROUND TESTING OF MIRV'S CURRENTLY
CONDUCTED BY THE UNITED STATES WHICH ARE CONSIDERABLY
BELOW THAT RANGE AND WOULD THAT NOT ALLOW THE CONTINUANCE
EVEN BEYOND THE TARGET DATE HERE OF ALL THE PROJECTABLE
OF MULTIPLE WARHEADS LIKELY TO BE PRODUCED BY BOTH SIDES.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: FIRST, THE DEGREE OF COOPERATION
BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES HAS NOT YET
REACHED THE POINT WERE THE GENERAL SECRETARY SHOWS ME
THE TEST OF HIS SPEECHES BEFORE HE MAKES THEM. (LAUGHTER)
AND THEREFORE, I AM NOT THE BEST WITNESS OF WHAT HE MAY
HAVE HAD IN MIND.

MY IMPRESSION FROM WHAT I HAVE OBSERVED IS THAT
BOTH SIDES HAVE TO CONVINCE THEIR MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

OF THE BENEFITS OF RESTRAINT AND THAT THAT IS NOT A
THOUGHT THAT COMES NATURALLY TO MILITARY PEOPLE ON EITHER SIDE.

NOW, BY DEFINITION, THE LIMITATIONS COULD HAVE BEEN
BROADER. ON THE ONE HAND AS YOU KNOW, THE SOVIET UNION HAS
BEEN PROPOSING A COMPLETE TEST BAN, BUT UNDER PROVISIONS
THAT ARE UNVERIFIABLE AND WITH ESCAPE CLAUSES WHICH
WOULD MAKE IT DIRECTED CLEARLY AGAINST OTHER COUNTRIES.
AND THEREFORE, WE HAVE DEFERRED A FURTHER DISCUSSION OF THE
TEST BAN, WHICH WE ARE NOT REJECTING IN PRINCIPSE, WHICH
INDEED WE ARE ACCEPTING IN PRINCIPLE FOR A LATER OCCASION.
SO I AM ASSUMING THIS IS ONE THING THE GENERAL SECRETARY
HAD IN MIND.

THE SECOND IS, FROM MY DESCRIPTION OF THE SALT
DISCUSSIONS, OBVIOUSLY A BROADER AGREEMENT IS CONCEIVABLE.
WITH RESPECT TO YOUR QUESTION, ARE THERE AGREED GUIDELINES
FOR GENEVA, THE IDEA OF EXTENDING THE TIME FRAME AROSE REALLY
ONLY ON MONDAY, AND IT WASN'T POSSIBLE TO WORK OUT DETAILED
AGREED GUIDELINES IN THE INTERVAL.

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 06 MOSCOW 10476 03 OF 05 031831Z

ON THE OTHER HAND, CERTAIN BASIC PRINCIPLES
DO EXIST AND I BELIEVE WE HAVE MADE A MAJOR STEP FORWARD
IN THE APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM.

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 10476 04 OF 05 031907Z

42
ACTION PRS-01

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 A-01

OPR-02 SAM-01 IO-14 ACDA-19 AEC-11 AECE-00 NASA-04

SAJ-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00

NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 SP-03 SS-20 SCI-06 DRC-01 SSO-00

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UNCLAS SECTION 4 OF 5 MOSCOW 10476

WITH RESPECT TO THE TESTING, IT IS NOT TRUE

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

THAT ALL THE PROJECTED MIRV DEVELOPMENTS ARE IN THE CATEGORY
BELOW 150. INDEED, THE ENTHUSIASM SEEMS TO RUN MORE IN
THE CATEGORIES ABOVE 150, COUPLED WITH IMPROVED ACCURACIES,
BUT WHENEVER I LINK THESE TWO I GET A REBUTTAL. SO I
MSUT BE CAUTIOUS. SO IF WE ARE CONCERNED THAT ONE OF
THE THREATS TO STABILITY IS THE COMBINATION AND ACCURACY
AND HIGHER YIELDS, THEN IN THE NEXT PHASE OF THE MIRV
WARHEAD RACE, THIS BAN WILL MAKE A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION.

CLEARLY FOR THE EXISTING MULTIPLE WARHEADS THE
TESTING HAS BEEN SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLETED ON BOTH SIDES.
WE ARE CONCERNED WITH THE NEXT GENERATION OF WARHEADS, NOT
THIS GENERATION OF WARHEADS AND WITH RESPECT TO THOSE,
IT WILL PLAY A VERY SIGNFICANT ROLE.

Q. MAY I FOLLOW THAT, DR. KISSINGER?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: YES.

Q. ON THIS QUESTION OF THE 150 THRESHOLD
JUST IF YOU CAN GET A LITTLE MORE SPECIFIC, WHAT WILL
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 10476 04 OF 05 031907Z

IT PREVENT US FROM DOING THAT WE HAD PLANNED TO DO, PLANNED
TO TEST AND WHAT WILL IT PREVENT THE SOVIETS FROM DOING
THAT WE KNOW THEY HAD PLANNED TO TEST?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: TO TELL YOU WHAT WE
KNOW ABOUT WHAT THE SOVIETS ARE PLANNING TO DO WOULD
PRESENT MAJOR PROBLEMS OF HOSPITALITY. (LAUGHTER)

Q. WE HAVE HAD SOME ALREADY. (LAUGHTER)

SECRETARY KISSINGER: YOU ARE SUPPOSED TO LAUGH
AT MY JOKES, NOT TOP THEM. (LAUGHTER)

I CANNOT OBVIOUSLY GO INTO WHAT WE WERE PLANNING
TO DO AND WHAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS PLANNING TO DO. IT IS
OBVIOUS THAT IF ONE OF THE CONCERNS IS THE ELABORATION
OF STRATEGIES THAT RELY ON FIRST STRIKES, AND IF, TO
PUT IT ANOTHER WAY, THE CONCERN OF EACH SIDE IS THAT THE
PROLIFERATION OF WARHEADS MIGHT MAKE IT SUBJECT TO
A FIRST STRIKE, THEN IT STANDS TO REASON THAT WITH THE
HARDENING OF SILOS, IT IS THE INCREASE IN THE EXPLOSIVE
POWER OF WARHEADS TOGETHER WITH IMPROVED ACCURACY THAT
BECOMES OF GREATEST CONCERN AND THEREFORE TO THE EXTENT
THAT THOSE STRATEGIES BECOME POSSIBLE, CONCEIVABLE OR
DOMINANT ON EACH SIDE, WHATEVER ITS PREVIOUS APPROACH,
EACH SIDE WILL BE DRIVEN TOWARDS THE ELABORATION OF
LARGER WARHEADS ON ITS MIRV'S.

SO I REPEAT, THIS IS ADDRESSED TO THE NEXT

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

GENERATION OF WARHEADS, NOT TO THE PRESENT GENERATION OF WARHEADS.

Q. WHAT I WAS GETTING AT THERE, AS I UNDERSTAND IT -- AND I COULD BE WRONG -- WE TEST IN MINIATURE, OR DO TO SOME EXTENT, WOULDN'T THAT PUT US WELL BELOW 150, BELOW 100 IN FACT, AND DO THE SOVIETS DO THE SAME KIND OF TESTING IN MINATURE NOR NOT?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I DON'T THINK THIS IS THE PLACE NOR CAN I THINK OF MANY MORE CONVENIENT PLACES (LAUGHTER) TO GO IN DETAILS INTO OUR METHODS OF TESTING
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 MOSCOW 10476 04 OF 05 031907Z

OR WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT THE SOVIET METHODS OF TESTING.

IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT MINATURE TESTING IS VERY RARLEY DONE, NEVER DONE WITH OPERATIONAL WEAPONS, AND THE CONCERN THAT HAS BEEN EXPRESSED TO US, AS WE WERE DISCUSSING THIS, WITHIN OUR GOVERNMENT, WAS PRECISELY THE NECESSITY OF FULL SCALE TESTS OF THOSE CATEGORIES OF WEAPONS OF PRINCIPAL SIGNIFICANCE.

Q. DR. KISSINGER, WILL THEY BE ABLE TO TEST MIRV'S ON THE SS-9 UNDER THAT 150 KILOTON LIMITATION?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: WHENEVER I DESCRIBE THE CHARACTERISTICS OF SOVIET WEAPONS TO SOVIET COLLEAGUES, THEIR SELF-CONTROL EVAPORATES. I DON'T KNOW HOW THEY FEEL WHEN I DESCRIBE THEM TO AMERICAN JOURNALISTS.

IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT NO MIRV'S ARE BEING PUT ON SS-9'S, THAT THEY ARE DEVELOPING A MISSILE OF COMPARABLE SIZE WHICH WILL HAVE A MIRV CAPABILITY. IA M NOT MAKING A HAIR-SPLITING POINT. THE WARHEAD OF THAT MISSILE WHICH WE CALL THE SS-18 AND IN WHICH OUR JUDGMENT IS THAT THE TESTING OF MIRV'S IS IN ITS VERY EARLY STAGE, THOSE WARHEADS, IN OUR JUDGMENT, WOULD BE CONSIDERABLY LARGER THAN 150 KILOTONS AND INDEED, IF THOSE WARHEADS COULD BE DRIVEN BELOW 150 KILOTONS, WE WOULD CONSIDER IT A CONSIDERABLE SUCCESS.

Q. DO YOU INTERPRET THIS LIMITATION AS IN EFFECT TO PREVENTING THEM FROM MIRVING ON SS-9'S OR SS-18'S?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: AS I SAID, THEY ARE NOT MIRVING THE SS-9'S. IN ORDER TO GET MIRV'S ON A LARGE MISSILE, THEY WOULD HAVE TO REPLACE THE SS-9 WITH A SS-18, BUT THAT IS JUST A REFINEMENT.

QUITE HONESTLY I BELIEVE THEY HAVE PROBABLY TESTED THE WARHEADS THEY WOULD WANT TO PUT ON THE SS-18 ALREADY.

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

HOWEVER, THESE HAVE ALWAYS TO BE CALCULATED IN TERMS OF
WEIGHT-TO-YIELD RATIO; THAT IS TO SAY, AT THE PRESENT STATE
OF THEIR TECHNOLOGY THERE MAY BE A LIMIT TO THE NUMBER OF
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 MOSCOW 10476 04 OF 05 031907Z

WARHEADS OF LARGE YIELD THEY CAN PUT ON THE SS-18, WHILE WITH
CONTINUED TESTING, THE NUMBER OF WARHEADS COULD BE MULTIPLIED
VERY CONSIDERABLY AND STILL MAINTAIN THE SAME EXPLOSIVE POWER,
BUT I DON'T WANT TO GO BEYOND THAT. BUT YOU HAVE TO LOOK AT
IT BOTH IN TERMS OF NUMBERS OF WARHEADS THAT CAN BE CARRIED
ON AN INDIVIDUAL MISSILE AS WELL AS IN TERMS OF THE EXPLOSIVE
POWER OF EACH WARHEAD AND BOTH OF THEM ARE A FUNCTION OF
TESTING, BECAUSE TESTING DETERMINES THE PACKAGING WHICH IS
TO SAY THE SIZE OF THE WARHEAD, AS WELL AS THE YIELD OF THE
WARHEAD.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, WILL YOU BE PRESENTING TO
MEMBERS OF THE CONGRESS ANY INDICATIONS OF A LESSENING
OF TENSIONS AND THE PROBLEMS WITH RESPECT TO EMIGRATION
AND HARASSMENT AND HAVE YOU FOUND ANY FURHTER UNDERSTANDING
AND RECEPTIVITY ON THE PART OF THE SOVIET LEADERS IN THIS
FIELD?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: THERE WAS A DISCUSSION OF THE
SUBJECT -- AND I WILL HAVE TO MAINTAIN THE POSITION THAT
WE HAVE PREVIOUSLY, WHICH IS TO SAY THAT WE BELIEVE THAT THE
OBJECTIVE WHICH WE THINK WE SHARE WITH THOSE WHO HAVE OTHER
APPROACHES CAN, IN OUR JUDGMENT, BE REALIZED MORE EFFECTIVELY
WITHOUT MAKING IT A PUBLIC GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT
CONFRONTATION.

Q. CAN'T YOU TELL US IF ANYTHING NEW HAS ARISEN,
NOT WHAT IT IS, BUT IF ANYTHING NEW HAS ARISEN.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I WILL DISCUSS THE SUBJECT
WITH THOSE WHO ARE INTERESTED IN THE CONGRESS AFTER I
RETURN, BUT I WILL NOT DISCUSS IT PUBLICLY, AS I HAVE STATED
CONSISTENTLY.

Q. DR. KISSINGER, YOU SOUND AS THOUGH YOU HAVE,
AT LEAST FOR THE TIME BEING, GIVEN UP HOPE FOR GETTING A
COMPREHENSIVE SALT AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIET UNION. IS THAT
CORRECT?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: NOT A COMPREHENSIVE, BUT A
PERMANENT, AND THIS IS NOT A QUESTION OF GIVING UP HOPE,
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 05 MOSCOW 10476 04 OF 05 031907Z

IT IS A QUESTION OF LOOKING AT THE REALITIES OF HOW TO
MOVE MATTERS FORWARD. WE HAVE BEEN OPERATING UP TO NOW WITHIN

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

THE CONSTRAINT OF EITHER A VERY SHORT TERM OR A SORT OF PERMANENT AGREEMENT.

NOW, PERMANENT WOULD HAVE TO HAVE REVIEW CLAUSES EVERY FIVE TO TEN YEARS ANYWAY. SO, WHEN YOU TALK OF 1985, THAT IS ABOUT AS PERMANENT AS YOU CAN REALISTICALLY BECOME UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES.

Q. DR. KISSINGER, WHAT IS THE VIEW OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF THE EFFECT ON THE GOOD WILL AND SPIRIT THAT THIS AGREEMENT AND THE OTHERS SEEK TO CREATE OF THE SOVIET EFFORTS TO INTERFERE WITH AMERICAN TELEVISION TRANSMISSIONS LAST NIGHT?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I DON'T KNOW THE DETAILS OF THE INTERFERENCE WITH THE TELEVISION TRANSMISSION, BUT WE CERTAINLY DON'T APPROVE OF IT.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, I THOUGHT I HEARD YOU SAY AT THE OUTSET THAT THE UNDERGROUND TESTING BAN -- I MAY HAVE MISHEARD YOU -- BUT I THOUGHT I HEARD YOU SAY THE UNDERGROUND TESTING BANINCLUDED SOME PROVISION FOR OBSERVERS. I CAN'T FIND IT. CAN YOU ELABORATE ON THAT?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: NO, THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE VERIFICATION OF PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS INCLUDED AN UNDERSTANDING WHICH IS NOT PART OF THE AGREEMENT, THAT THE VERIFICATION OF THE UNDER-GROUND EXPLOSIONS WOULD INVOLVE, AMONG OTHER THINGS, THE SPECIFICATION OF TIME AND PLACE, AND THE PRESENCE OF OBSERVERS.

THAT, IN ITSELF, IS NOT ENOUGH, HOWEVER. IT IS NOT WRITTEN IN THE DOCUMENT, AND YOU ARE QUITE CORRECT IN NOT FINDING IT BECAUSE THIS IS, I BELIEVE, ARTICLE III, AND ARTICLE III SIMPLY SAYS IT WILL BE NEGOTIATED IN THE EARLIEST TIME, AND I AM SIMPLY INDICATING THAT WE DID DISCUSS SOME OF THE SUBSTANCE OF THIS ARTICLE III, EVEN NOW.

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 06 MOSCOW 10476 04 OF 05 031907Z

THE DIFFICULTY WITH PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS, OR THE INSPECTION DIFFICULTY OR VERIFICATION DIFFICULTY, IS ON TWO LEVELS. BELOW THE THRESHOLD LEVEL OF 150 KILOTONS, IT DOES NOT PRESENT A PROBLEM OF MAGNITUDE, BUT IT PRESENTS A PROBLEM OF LOCATION.

AS YOU KNOW FROM THE AGREEMENT, THE LOCATION OF MILITARY TEST SITES IS SPECIFIED AND GEOLOGICAL INFORMATION IS EXCHANGED AND ALSO, THERE IS PROVISION, AS YOU CAN SEE IN THE PROTOCOL, FOR CALIBRATION SHOTS.

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

THEREFORE, WE HAVE A SUBSTANTIAL DEGREE OF CONFIDENCE
WITHIN A FACTOR THAT IS VERY TOLERABLE FOR MILITARY PURPOSES
THAT WE WILL KNOW VIOLATIONS OF THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN AS
LONG AS THE TESTING TAKES PLACE AT KNOWN SITES.

A PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSION OBVIOUSLY WILL
ALMOST NEVER TAKE PLACE AT MILITARY TEST SITES; THEREFORE
WE WILL HAVE LESS GEOLOGICAL INFORMATION; THEREFORE, SPECIAL
VERIFICATION PROCEDURES WILL HAVE TO BE USED.

THIS IS BELOW 150 KILOTONS. IF THE PEACEFUL
NUCLEAR EXPLOSION SHOULD BE ABOVE 150 KILOTONS, EVEN MORE
STRINGENT REQUIREMENTS EXIST TO MAKE SURE THAT PEACEFUL
NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS DO NOT HIDE MILITARY TESTING AND THOSE
PROVISIONS FRANKLY HAVE NOT BEEN WORKED OUT, BUT THERE IS AN
UNDERSTANDING THAT THEY WILL INCLUDE THE PRESENCE OF OBSERVERS.

Q. FOR THOSE OF US WITHOUT A DEEP BACKGROUND
IN THE ARMS NEGOTIATIONS, IS THIS THEN THE FIRST TIME THE
SOVIET UNION HAS -- LEAVING SIDE WHAT KIND OF TESTS THESE
ARE -- AGREED TO ON-SITE INSPECTION?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: THAT IS CORRECT. BUT
AGREED IN THE FORM OF AN UNWRITTEN UNDERSTANDING. THIS
DOES NOT EXIST YET.

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 10476 05 OF 05 032008Z

63
ACTION PRS-01

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 A-01

OPR-02 SAM-01 IO-14 ACDA-19 AEC-11 AECE-00 NASA-04

SAJ-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00

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UNCLAS SECTION 5 OF 5 MOSCOW 10476

Q. SIR, DOES THIS UNDERSTANDING SPECIFY AS TO WHETHER
THESE OBSERVERS WILL BE PRINCIPALS OF BOTH COUNTRIES OR
WHETHER THEY WILL BE THIRD NATION OBSERVERS OR PERHAPS
OBSERVERS FROM AN INTERNATIONAL BODY?

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

SECRETARY KISSINGER: THIS HAS NOT BEEN WORKED OUT. IN THE CONTEXT OF THE DISCUSSIONS, IT WAS FROM THE TWO COUNTRIES, WHIH INCIDENTALLY IS MUCH MORE REASSURING TO THE TWO COUNTRIES THAN TO BRING IN OUTSIDERS, BUT THAT IS A QUESTION THAT HAS NOT BEEN REFINED.

Q. DR. KISSINGER, ARE WE OR THE RUSSIANS CURRENTLY TESTING ANY ANY WARHEADS LARGER THAN 150 KILOTONS?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: AS I POINTED OUT, BECAUSE THERE IS NO SENSE IN MISLEADING ANYBODY, OVIOUSLY THE WARHEADS FOR THE CURRENT GENERATION HAVE BEEN SUBSTANTIALLY TESTED ALMOST CERTAINLY BY BOTH SIDES. WHAT WILL BE AFFECTED IS THE IMPROVED PACKAGING OF NEW GENERATIONS OR THE IMPROVED YIELD OF NEW GENERATIONS, NOT OF MISSILES NECESSARILY, BUT OF WARHEADS.

IN THAT SENSE, WITHOUT GOING INTO THE TESTING PROGRAMS, I
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 10476 05 OF 05 032008Z

THINK IT IS CORRECT TO SAY THAT THE TREND OF THE ARMS RACE IS IN THE DIRECTION OF THE HIGHER YIELDS, FOR REASONS WHICH I HAVE GAVE YOU.

1. WHAT ABOUT THE PROBLEM OF DECOUPLING?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: THE PROBLEM OF DECOUPLING, I THINK HAS BEEN INSOFAR AS IT CAN BE, TAKEN CARE OF BY THE EXCHANGE OF GEOLOGICAL INFORMATION AND BY THE CALIBRATION SHOTS.

Q. I AM KIND OF PUZZLED HOW YOU CAN TAKE WHAT HAPPENED HERE ON SALT AS ANTYTHING LESS THAN A SETBACK. IF YOU HAVE CHANGED FROM SEARCHING FOR A PERMANENT AGREEMENT TO SEARCHING FOR ONE IN A FINITE TIME PERIOD, AND YOU POSTPONED THE TIME YOU HAVE HIVEN YOURSELF, OR YOU HAVE PUT BACK THE TIME YOU HAVE GIVEN YOURSELF TO FIND THAT AGREEMENT. IT SEEMS TO ME THERE ARE TWO SETBACKS THERE, AND I DON'T SEE HOW YOU CAN SAY THIS HAS'T BEEN A FAILURE AT THE SUMMIT.

Q. WE COULDN'T HEAR THE QUESTION.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: IT IS JUST AS WELL. (LAUGHTER) THE QUESTION IS HOW WE CAN CONSTRUE SALT AS ANYTHING OTHER THAN A SETBACK BECAUSE WE EXTENDED THE TIME PERIOD FOR NEGOTIATION AND WE SHORTNEED THE TIME PERIOD OF THE AGREEMENT TO BE REACHED.
IS THAT CORRECT?

Q. YES.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: IF YOU APPROACH IT IN A FORMALISTIC WAY, THEN THESE ARE VALID ARGUMENTS. IF YOU APPROACH IT FROM THE

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

POINT OF VIEW OF WHAT WILL IN FACT CONTRIBUTE TO SLOWING DOWN THE ARMS RACE, THEN I BELIEVE THAT WE HAVE FOUND AN APPROACH IN WHICH THE FACTORS THAT HAVE INHIBITED PROGRESS CAN BE HOPEFULLY OVERCOME.

THE DIFFICULTY WITH THE PREVIOUS NEGOTIATIONS HAS BEEN THAT IT HAS PROVED EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO RECONCILE THE VARIOUS ASYMMETRIES THAT EXIST IN THE DESIGN OF THE FORCES, IN THE LOCATIONS OF THE FORCES AND IN THE RELATIVE DEPLOYMENT
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 MOSCOW 10476 05 OF 05 032008Z

RATES OF THE FORCES. AND THE TIME LIMITS WE HAVE BEEN TALING ABOUT UNTIL THIS VISIT CREATED A SITUATION IN WHICH BOTH SIDES WOULD BE PRESSING AGAINST THE LIMITS OF THE AGREEMENT AT THE PRECISE MOMENT OF ITS EXPIRATION DATE, THE SOVIET UNION FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF QUALITY, THE UNITED STATES FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF QUANTITY, AND THEREFORE, THERE WAS A GREAT DANGER THAT THE MERE EXPIRATION DATE MIGHT FUEL, ESPECIALLY IN ITS FINAL PHASES, A RACE.

AND AS A RESULT OF THE DISCUSSIONS THAT TOOK PLACE SUNDAY, WHERE FOR THE FIRST TIME, I BELIEVE, AT LEAST WHERE THED CONCERNS AND THE PERCEPTIONS OF BOTH SIDES WERE PUT BEFORE EACH OTHER IN WHAT I CONSIDERED AN UNUSUALLY FRANK WAY, AND IN WHICH IT TURNED OUT THAT THE PERCEPTIONS BY EACH SIDE OF THE OTHER REALLY WAS REMARKABLY CLOSE -- THE ONLY DIFFERENCE BEING THAT EACH SIDE OF COURSE HAS TO TAKE THE WORST CASE OF WHAT THE OTHER ONE MIGHT DO; I THINK THIS WAS THE MAJOR GAP THAT EXISTED -- IT BECAME APPARENT THAT THE TIME PRESSURE WAS A GREATER FACTOR THAN HAD BEEN COMMONLY UNDERSTOOD BY EITHER SIDE.

SO, I DON'T WANT TO DO THIS IN TERMS OF SETBACK. WE ARE NOT RUNNING A RACE WITH OURSELVES. THIS IS A PROBLEM WHICH I HAVE BEEN STRESSING WILL BE WITH US FOR A LONG TIME AND IT SHOULDN'T BE SEEN IN TERMS OF HITTING A HOME RUN ON ANY ONE OCCASION.

Q. YOU, AT THE BRUSSELS BRIEFING, S
ID THERE WAS ONLY 18
MONTHS BEFORE THEIR DECISIONS WERE IRREVOCABLE AND EACH SIX MONTHS MADE IT WORSE IN TERMS OF THE RATE OF DEPLOYMENT.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: THAT IS RIGHT AND I HAVE REAFFIRMED THAT HERE.

Q. BUT WHAT I MEAN IS YOU INTRODUCED THE TIME PRESSURE AS YOU CALL IT.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: THERE ARE TWO TIME FACTORS, THE TIME FACTOR AVAILABLE FOR NEGOTIATION AND THE TIME FACTOR INVOLVED IN THE LENGTH OF THE AGREEMENT. I HAVE REAFFIRMED HERE THAT IN MY JUDGEMENT THE TIME FRAME IN WHICH THE PROBLEMS THAT I HAVE IDENTIFIED CAN BE CONSTRUCTIVELY SETTLED IS IN THE 18 MONTH RANGE -- 24 MONTHS, 18 MONTHS -- IN THAT RANGE,

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

AND ONE OF THE REASONS FOR 1985 IS THAT IF THIS AGREEMENT WERE TO BE CONCLUDED IN '75, IT WOULD THEN TAKE CARE OF THE NEXT DECADE. THIS WAS ONE OF THE REASONS BEHIND IT.

SO THAT TIME FACTOR STILL EXISTS AND THAT TIME FACTOR WILL PRESS ON US AND MUST PRESS ON US IF WE ARE SERIOUS.

Q. CAN I FOLLOW UP ON THAT, SIR? WHAT WOULD YOU ENVISION WILL HAPPEN THEN IF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT EXPREST OR IS ALLOWED TO EXPRE IN 1977 BUT YOU HAVE NOT YET REACHED A REPLACEMENT AGREEMENT -- WHAT WILL HAPPEN BETWEEN 1977 AND 1985 IN TERMS OF THE ARMS RACE PSYCHOLOGY?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: IF WE HAVE NOT REACHED AN AGREEMENT WELL BEFORE 1977, THEN I BELIEVE YOU WILL SEE AN EXPLOSION OF TECHNOLOGY AND AN EXPLOSION OF NUMBERS AT THE END OF WHICH WE WILL BE LUCKY IF WE HAVE THE PRESENT STABILITY; IN WHICH IT WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE TO DESCRIBE WHAT STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY MEANS. AND ONE OF THE QUESTIONS WHICH WE HAVE TO ASK OUR-SELVES AS A COUNTRY IS WHAT IN THE NAME OF GOD IS STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY? WHAT IS THE SIGNIFICANCE OF IT, POLITICALLY, MILITARILY, OPERATIONALLY, AT THESE LEVELS OF NUMBERS? WHAT DO YOU WITH IT?

BUT MY PREDICTION WOULD BE THAT IF WE DO NOT SOLVE THIS PROBLEM WELL BEFORE, IN MY JUDGEMENT, THE END OF THE EXPIRATION OF THE AGREEMENT, WE WILL BE LIVING IN A WORLD WHICH WILL BE EXTRAORDINARILY COMPLEX, IN WHICH OPPORTUNITIES FOR NUCLEAR WARFARE EXIST THAT WERE UNIMAGINABLE 15 YEARS AGO AT THE BEGINNING OF THE NUCLEAR AGE, AND THAT IS WHAT IS DRIVING OUR CONCERN, NOT THE DISPUTES THAT ONE READS IN THE DAY-TO-DAY--

Q. ONE LAST POINT, ON THE WEATHER MODIFICATION, SIR, COULD YOU CLARIFY? YOU ONLY REFERRED TO IT VERY BRIEFLY. WEATHER MODIFICATION TECHNIQUES, AS I UNDERSTAND, PROVED A FAILURE IN THE VIETNAM WAR. COULD YOU EXPLAIN WHY THE ISSUE IS REGARDED AS SIGNIFICANT IN ARMS CONTROL?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: WELL, THE ISSUE IS SIGNIFICANT BECAUSE THE PROBLEM IXISTS. AND IT IS NOT A PROBLEM, FRANKLY, THAT WE HAVE COMPLETELY UNDERSTOOD. WE HAVE JUST STARTED OUR

STUDIES ON THE SUBJECT. HOW SIGNIFICANT IT IS, FRANKLY, WILL BECOME APPARENT ONLY AS TIME GOES ON. IT IS SIGNIFICANT FOR THE DETERMINATION OF THE TWO SIDES TO TRY TO LIMIT NEW AREAS OF ARMS COMPETITION.

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

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THE PRESS: THANK YOU, MR. SECRETARY.
STOESSEL

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 27 JUL 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: NUCLEAR AGREEMENTS, PRESS CONFERENCES, SUMMIT MEETINGS, COMMUNIQUES
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 03 JUL 1974
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: n/a
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: n/a
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment:
Disposition Date: 01 JAN 1960
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974MOSCOW10476
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 NA
Errors: n/a
Film Number: D740176-1080
From: MOSCOW
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19740789/abbrzbcn.tel
Line Count: 1193
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION PRS
Original Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 22
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: n/a
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: martinjw
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 30 AUG 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <30 AUG 2002 by ThomasVJ>; APPROVED <15 JAN 2003 by martinjw>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: KISSINGER PRESS CONFERENCE JULY 3
TAGS: PFOR, UR, US, (KISSINGER, HENRY A)
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

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